EUVD-2026-104668

The html_to_markdown expansion module in MISP Modules contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its is_safe_url() URL validation function. The BLOCKED_RANGES list used to reject unsafe destination addresses was incomplete, omitting several critical IP address ranges. Specifically, the following ranges were not blocked: 0.0.0.0/8 (unspecified, which routes to loopback on Linux), 100.64.0.0/10 (carrier-grade NAT per RFC 6598), ::/128 (IPv6 unspecified), fc00::/7 (IPv6 Unique Local Addresses), and fe80::/10 (IPv6 link-local). The existing list only covered IPv4 loopback (127.0.0.0/8), RFC 1918 private ranges, IPv4 link-local (169.254.0.0/16), and IPv6 loopback (::1/128). An authenticated user with the ability to create or modify MISP attributes that trigger the html_to_markdown expansion module could supply URLs pointing to these unblocked internal address ranges. Because the module fetches the URL server-side to convert HTML content to Markdown, the request is made from the MISP server's network context. This allows an attacker to probe and read responses from internal services, carrier-grade NAT infrastructure, or link-local endpoints that would otherwise be unreachable from external networks. IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms (e.g., [::ffff:0.0.0.0]) also bypassed the existing checks. The security impact is primarily confidentiality: an attacker can read data served by internal services reachable from the MISP server. The MISP instance itself is not compromised, but it is abused as a proxy to access otherwise restricted network resources.