Deception Engineering and High-Confidence Signals
Learn how decoys create controlled security claims, why a rare trigger still needs context, and how deception can produc...
3 lessons · 2 hr 30 minCourse
Software Supply Chain Detection Reasoning
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Difficulty
Advanced
Modules
3
Lessons
3
Time
2 hr 30 min
Language
en
Created by
Threat Intelligence Lab
Updated
16 September 2026
About this course
Follow trust and identity from developer to source, workflow, runner, artifact, registry, deployment, Kubernetes control plane, and runtime. The course is written for one reader and develops its ideas through continuous explanation, realistic thought experiments, and explicit distinctions between fact, assessment, and uncertainty.
What you'll learn
- ✓ Reason from a security concern to evidence and a bounded analytical claim.
- ✓ Explain assumptions, tradeoffs, and limitations in plain language.
Before you begin
You will get more from this course if these foundations are already familiar.
- Detection Engineering: From Telemetry to Tuned Detections — You should understand the basic detection lifecycle and common telemetry sources.
Course content
Module 1: Trust Travels from Source to Runtime
Map developers, repositories, workflows, runners, registries, deployers, and workloads as one chain of authority.
Module 2: Authorized Features Can Carry Unauthorized Change
Detect consequential state changes even when attackers use valid accounts and normal platform capabilities.
Module 3: Provenance Strengthens a Claim Without Making It Absolute
Use artifact identity, builder claims, verification policy, and deployment evidence without treating a signature as proof of benign intent.